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OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS RIGHTS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
MICHAEL CROMMELIN*

The last decade has witnessed the dramatic shift in the focus of
world oil and gas exploration and development from the land to the
sea. Rapid advances in marine technology have allowed the search to
spread from the shallow waters of coastal zones, where drilling was
known as early as the end of the last century,' to the edge of the
continental margins and beyond. Proved offshore oil reserves are
more than 100 billion barrels, and in 1973 production was in excess
of 10 million barrels per day, 2 representing 19 per cent of the world
total? It has been estimated that by the late 1980's, offshore regions
will provide at least half of the world production of oil and gas.4
The rights of coastal states over offshore oil and gas resources are
derived from international law. A most important characteristic of
these rights is that they accrue to states as such, with the result that
the resources are, in the first instance, the subject of exclusive public
ownership or control. The governments of coastal states are thus
given the opportunity to develop a comprehensive system of public
law for the management of these resources. Such an opportunity was
notably absent in the regulation of onshore oil and gas development
in the United States and Canada, where private ownership was a
significant factor in the evolution of management regimes.
In the United States, Canada and Australia, the federal system of
government has complicated the management of offshore oil and gas
resources by giving rise to disputes over jurisdiction. None of these
has yet been finally determined.' However, it is not the purpose of
*B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) (Qld.), LL.M. (U.B.C.).
1. In 1897, wells were drilled from wharves extending over the ocean near Santa Barbara,
California: Krueger, The Development and Administration of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands of the United States, 14 Rocky Mt. Mineral L. Institute 643 at 675 (1968).
2. Report of the Secretary General to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed
and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/87 (4
June 1973).
3. Oil & Gas J., May 6, 1974, at 125.

4. Id.
5. The legal and political developments in the United States are described by Krueger,
supra note 1, at 674-688. Suits are still pending in relation to the east coast region, United
States v. Maine, No. 35, orig. (Motion for leave to file bill of complaint granted, 395 U.S.
955 (1969), and Cook Inlet, U.S. v. Alaska, 352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1972) (appeal
pending). For a review of the Canadian position, see Beauchamp, Crommelin & Thompson,

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

this article to review either the history or the present status of the
competing claims. Despite them, the federal governments have established management systems applicable to at least part of their offshore regions and it is these systems that will be examined here.

The offshore oil and gas regimes of four countries will be considered: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. These management systems are basically similar in that, until
now, reliance has been placed mainly upon private enterprise for

development of the resources. However, this approach has recently
been challenged in each of the countries and the suggestion has been

made that governments should participate directly in oil and gas
operation. This is a reflection of the different views advanced in the
United Nations Seabeds Committee on the subject of exploitation of
ocean mineral resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
The developed countries favour the licensing of private enterprise
whereas the developing countries advocate the creation of an international public enterprise with power to explore and develop directly.

To some extent the turn to government participation is the result
of disillusionment with existing resource management systems. It is,
therefore, interesting to examine the offshore oil and gas regimes of

the four countries to assess their effectiveness in the management of
publicly-owned resources. It is proposed first to give a brief description of the allocation process and the nature of the rights acquired in
each jurisdiction and then to compare the four management systems
and discuss their relative merits and deficiencies.
THE ALLOCATION PROCESS FOR OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS RIGHTS
A.

The United States of America6
The legislation governing offshore oil and gas resources within

federal jurisdiction is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of
Jurisdictional Problems in Canada's Offshore, 11 Alberta L. Rev. 431 (1973). Negotiations

have been in progress for more than a year between the federal government and the governments of the five eastern provinces concerning jurisdiction off the east coast. In Australia,
the federal and state governments attempted to set aside jurisdictional difficulties with an
Agreement to legislate in identical terms to control offshore operations (1967). For further
details, see Senate Select Comm. on Off-Shore Petroleum Resources, Report (Austl. 1971).
Recently, the federal government has reasserted exclusive jurisdiction in the Seas and Submerged Lands Bill 1973.
6. This subject has been dealt with extensively in two articles by Robert B. Krueger, The
Background of the Doctrine of the Continental Shelf and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 10 Natural Resources J. 442 (1970) and An Evaluation of the Provision and Policies of
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10 Natural Resources J. 763 (1970). These in turn

are based on Nossaman, Waters, Scott, Krueger & Riordan [law firm], Study of Outer
Continental Shelf Lands of the United States (prepared for Public Land Review Commission, 1968) [hereinafter cited as OC9 Study].
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1953.7 The functions of this statute are twofold. First, it establishes
the basic outline for a system of allocation of oil and gas rights. The
Secretary of the Interior may issue oil and gas leases giving the
holders thereof exploration and production rights with respect to
specified areas of outer continental shelf lands; leases must be allocated competitively; the minimum royalty is fixed at 121/2 percent;
the maximum lease area is 5700 acres; and the term of a lease is "five
years and as long thereafter as oil or gas may be produced from the
area in paying quantities..."'
Second, the statute vests in the Secretary of the Interior a broad
authority to implement the allocation system by issuing regulations
dealing with a wide range of specified matters, including the prevention of waste and the conservation of the natural resources of the
outer continental shelf lands. 9 The requirement of competitive
bidding is of fundamental importance. The Secretary of the Interior
has no power to award production rights on any other basis. He may,
however, choose between two varieties of competitive bidding,
namely, cash bonus bidding with fixed royalty, and royalty bidding
with fixed cash bonus.' 0
The practice adopted by the Secretary to date has been to employ
cash bonus bidding with the royalty rate fixed at one-sixth of wellhead production. The Public Land Law Review Commission was
critical of this approach, and recommended that " . . . [fIlexible
methods of pricing should be encouraged, rather than the present
exclusive reliance on bonus bidding plus a fixed royalty."'' 1 There
has also been support for royalty bidding from some members of
Congress and sections of the oil and gas industry. In response to this
pressure, the Department of the Interior has made plans to conduct a
limited experiment with royalty bidding in an offshore Louisiana sale
in September, 1974, by offering ten tracts for allocation by this
method.' 2
The Department has recognized that the effectiveness of the bonus
bidding system is dependent in large part upon the maintenance of
an acceptable degree of competition among applicants for leases.
Congress was undoubtedly aware of this in 1953, for it included in
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act a provision demanding sealed
bids. In addition, the Department has attempted to deal with the
7. 43 U.S.C. § § 1331-1343 (1971).
8. 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (1971).
9. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (1971).
10. 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (1971).
11. Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land (Report to
the President and to Congress, 1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC Report].
12. Oil & Gas J., May 13, 1974, at 32.
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problem of competition in two ways: by rejecting bids which fall
below a calculated "minimum" and by regulating the number of
tracts available for leasing in any particular year.
Since 1959 increasing efforts have been made to appraise the value
of tracts prior to leasing.' ' This has been found easiest in relation to
drainage sales' ' as actual data from drill holes nearby is available for
use.' 5 The first attempt to determine minimum acceptable bids on
new area sales was made for the June 1967 Louisiana sale, using a
procedure developed for a previous drainage sale. However, it was
found that the available geological data was too incomplete for this
to be done successfully. 1 6
A more comprehensive system was developed for the 1968 Santa
Barbara sale. The system involved selecting a tract for which adequate geological and engineering data were available, and using it as a
base against which to compare others. The system took into account
many of the factors that affect the value of tracts: geological probability of discovery, value of petroleum, initial production per well,
field decline rate, size of reservoir, capital investment, expected rate
of return, probable well depth, water depth, operating cost, development time and others. In the Department's view, however, the system suffered from the inherent weakness that available data was not
sufficient to estimate the amount of oil and gas likely to be present
in each tract, the most critical element in establishing lease values.'
In all lease sales the Secretary of the Interior retains the right to
reject bids at his discretion. Several factors have been taken into
account in rejecting bids: geological and economic evaluations performed by the Geological Survey, analysis of company operational
performance, prior history of the particular tract offered, overall
performance of the bidder at the sale, and the economic analyses
described above.' 8
The Public Land Law Review Commission noted that approximately 5 per cent of high bids had been rejected by the Secretary,
and that the ratio of rejections to acceptances of bids had increased
in sales prior to its 1970 report. Since then, no consistent pattern has
emerged. The ratio continued to increase at first, then declined, but
13. 1A R. Coulter, Administration of Mineral Leasing on the United States Outer Continental Shelf at IV-19 (submission on behalf of the Department of the Interior to the Royal
Commission on Barrier Reef Petroleum Drilling, Commonwealth of Australia, 1971).
14. The sale of land in danger of being drained by production on adjacent lands.
15. 1A Coulter, supra, note 13, at IV-53.
16. Id., at IV-50, 51.
17. Id., at IV-51,52.
18. Id., at IV-54, 55.
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recently increased dramatically.' 9 This most recent increase may
indicate a renewed effort by the Department to evaluate lease tracts
prior to sale. The Commission recommended that the Secretary
should retain the discretion to reject bids but should be required to
state the reasons for rejection. Moreover, judicial review of such a
decision should be available only where it is established to be arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. 2 0
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act contains no reference to
the size or timing of lease sales. The regulations promulgated under
the Act provide that leases shall be issued competitively upon
"requests describing areas and expressing an interest in leasing of

minerals" or upon a call "for nominations of tracts for the leasing of
minerals in specified areas." 2
In the past, a system developed
whereby the oil and gas industry carried out preliminary geological

and geophysical exploration operations, and then submitted requests
to the Bureau of Land Management for any promising areas to be
offered for lease. When the Bureau was of the opinion that suffient
interest existed in an area to warrant a sale, official leasing maps were
issued showing the area to be leased, divided into tracts, and nominations were called from industry. The Bureau then decided which

tracts in the area should be put up for bids, primarily on the basis of
nominations received. 2 2
Prior to 1962 nearly all nominated tracts were offered for sale.
However, the number and frequency of nominations tended to increase, and in 1962 the Bureau of Land Management decided that

selection among nominations was required if effective competition

was to be maintained. 2 3 This decision was prompted by the experience gained in the split Louisiana and Texas sales held on March 13
and 16 of that year, when tracts covering 3,679,000 acres were
offered. This sale attracted a relatively low average number of bids

per tract acre. 2"

Until a few months ago, the selection process

19. In the Louisiana sale of December 1970, 127 tracts were offered and all drew at least
one bid, but only 117 leases were awarded: Oil & Gas J., July 9, 1973, at 31. In a Louisiana
sale in September 1972, 74 tracts received bids, but only 62 leases were awarded: id., Sept.
18, 1972, at 38. In a nearby sale in December 1972, high bids were rejected on 3 of 122
tracts: id., Jan. 15, 1973, at 43. In a Texas sale in June 1973, high bids were accepted on
100 of 104 tracts: id., July 9, 1973. In an eastern Gulf sale in December 1973, high bids
were accepted on 87 of 89 tracts: id., Jan. 21, 1974, at 39. In the Louisiana sale of March
1974, high bids were accepted on only 100 of 123 tracts: id., Apr. 22, 1974, at 62. In the
Texas sale of May 1974, this trend continued when high bids were rejected on 21 of 123
tracts: id., June 17, 1974, at 21.
20. PLLRC Report, supra note 11, at 192.
21. 43 C.F.R. § 3301.3 (1973).
22. 1A Coulter, supra note 13, at IV-10.
23. Id., at IV-15.
24. Id., at IV-7.
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caused a substantial reduction in the area offered for leasing at
sales. 2 '
In 1971, acting upon a recommendation of the Public Land Law
Review Commission, 2 6 the Department of the Interior adopted a
five-year lease schedule. The steps to be followed in the schedule
were:
(a) forecast demand on a national and regional basis;
(b) forecast supply from areas other than outer continental shelf
lands, on a national and regional basis;
(c) estimate the needed supply from outer continental shelf lands on
a regional basis;
(d) estimate the available resources of outer continental shelf lands;
(e) develop a preliminary schedule of lease sales by area to yield
needed production and supporting reserves;
(f) adjust the preliminary sale schedule to consider further factors
sensitivity, multiple use conflicts, and public
such as environmental
2
hearing procedures. 7

More recently, President Nixon responded to energy shortages in
the United States by ordering an acceleration of offshore leasing.2
At first the schedule was amended to provide for three sales of one
million acres each in January, May, and September, beginning in
1974 and continuing for four years thereafter.2 9 Now there are plans
to increase the annual area offered for leasing from 3 million acres to
10 million acres. 3" It is not clear whether the Department of the
Interior will continue to follow the demand and supply assessment
procedures outlined in the 1971 schedule.
Since the enactment of the National Environment Policy Act of
1969.' 1 the Department of the Interior has been required to prepare
25. The 1968 Santa Barbara sale offered 540,000 acres for leasing. The Louisiana Sale of
December 1970 made available 593,485 acres. In two Louisiana sales in 1972, a total of
984,758 acres was offered. In the 1973 Texas sale, almost 600,000 acres were made
available while in the eastern Gulf sale in December of that year, 817,397 acres were put up
for bids. In the Lousiana sale of March 1974, over 914,000 acres were offered for lease
while in the Texas sale of May 1974, 1,355,678 acres were made available. Tract selection
by the Bureau of Land Management has been based upon the following factors: the number
of times each tract was nominated; the number of times each tract was shot (seismic
surverys); the potential offered by each tract for adding to technological knowledge about
the area and production capabilities in deep water; and technical data when available. Id., at
IV-15.
26. PLLRC Report, supra note 11 at 192.
27. 1A Coulter, supra note 13, at IV-8.
28. Energy Message to Congress, April 18, 1973.
29. Oil & Gas J., July 16, 1973, at 86.
30. Oil & Gas J., April 22, 1974, at 68.
31. 42 U.S.C. § § 4321-4347 (1971).
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an impact statement prior to each proposed sale, dealing with the
fol&owing matters:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long term productivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.3 2
In December 1971, the Department was forced to cancel a sale of
leases offshore of Louisiana after bids for the leases had been submitted, when a federal court ruled that the impact statement was
inadequate in that it gave insufficient consideration to alternatives to
the proposed sale. 3 This in turn caused the delay of a further sale
scheduled for May 1972. More detailed impact statements were then
prepared and public hearings conducted in relation to both sales,
which were held in September and December 1972.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provides for geological and
geophysicaj exploration prior to lease allocation, provided that it is
not "unduly harmful to aquatic life." 3 * So far, no regulations have
been issued, but the Secretary of the Interior has given general
authorization for such exploration on all outer continental shelf
lands. A permit is required, applications for which are administered
by the U.S. Geological Survey. Exploration rights under a permit are
non-exclusive. The only drilling allowed is core drilling, involving
3
shallow holes to extract rock samples for geological examination. 1
The Act does not require the disclosure of exploration results to
federal agencies. Permits do provide that limited data consisting
principally of samples and related information from geological
exploration be furnished to the Geological Survey.6 However,
geophysical data is not disclosed.
The Public Land Law Review Commission recognized the handicap placed upon the Department of the Interior by this limited
access to data, and recommended that:
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C)(i)-(v) (1971).
Oil & Gas J., April 10, 1972, at 87.
43 U.S.C. § 1340 (1971).
lB Coulter, supra note 13, at VIII-1.
1 OCS Study, supra note 6, at 184.
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[t] he Federal Government should undertake an expanded offshore
program of collection and dissemination of basic geological and .
geophysical data.
As part of that program, information developed under exploration
permits should be fully disclosed to the Government in advance of
Outer Continental Shelf lease sales. However, industry evaluations of
raw data should be treated as proprietary and excluded from mandatory disclosure. 3 7

Regulations under consideration by the Department would require
the holder of a geophysical permit to submit all or any portion of his
processed information and data to the Geological Survey in a format
and quality suitable for interpretation. 3 8 This provision has attracted
considerable industry opposition, 3 9 and the regulations have not
been promulgated.
Existing regulations under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
permit only United States citizens and corporations to hold leases.4 0
However, this does not exclude foreign nationals and corporations as
they may use domestic corporations to acquire leases.
The revenues obtained by the federal government from oil and gas
operations on outer continental shelf lands are substantial. Five
categories may be distinguished: (a) bonus payments, (b) royalty
payments, (c) rent, (d) minimum royalties, and (e) shut-in gas payments. Rent has commonly been payable at the rate of $3 per acre,
but at two sales the figure has been $5 per acre, and at four sales it
was set at $10 per acre. 4 1 Bonus payments have overshadowed all
other government receipts.4 2 Since 1954 bonus bidding has raised in
excess of $13.4 billion. 4
44

B. The United Kingdom
Interest in the hydrocarbon potential of the North Sea began after
big discoveries of gas were made in the province of Groningen in
37. PLLRC Report, supra note 11, at 192.
38. 1 B Coulter, supra note 13, at VIII-15.

39. Id.
40. 43 C.F.R. § 3300.1 (1973).
41. 1A Coulter, supra note 13, at IV-64.
42. Up until the end of 1967, bonus payments amounted to $1,938 million whereas
royalty payments, rent, minimum royalties and shut-in gas payments together were only
$847 million. 1 oCS Study, supra note 6, at 542, 544, 545, & 548-549, tables 8-24 to 8-27.
43. This is up to and including the Texas sale of May 1974. In the four most recent sales,
the following amounts have been received by the Department of the Interior in high bids:
offshore Texas (June 1973), $1.59 billion; eastern Gulf of Mexico (December 1973), $1.49
billion; offshore Louisiana (March 1974), $2.09 billion; offshore Texas (May 1974), $1.47
billion.
44. A detailed description of the early allocation rounds (1964-65) is provided by Dam,
Oil and Gas Licensing in the North Sea, 8 J. Law & Econ. 51 (1965). A review of all
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Holland in 1959 and 1962.' ' Several companies carried out seismic,
gravity, and magnetic surveys of the southern part of the North Sea
in anticipation of the enactment by coastal states of legislation providing for exploration and production rights.
On April 15, 1964, the United Kingdom Parliament passed the
Continental Shelf Act 1964. 4 6 This statute vested in the Crown "all
rights exercisable by the United Kingdom outside territorial waters
with respect to the seabed and subsoil and their natural resources". 4 " So far as oil and gas were concerned, the provisions of
the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934' 1 relating to the granting of
licences were extended to such offshore areas.4 9
The Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 was passed to regulate onshore oil and gas activities in Britain which had been conducted
without great success since 1918. The Act originally empowered the
Board of Trade on behalf of the Crown to grant licences to search
and bore for and get petroleum upon such terms and conditions as
the Board thought fit.' 0 Before granting any licences, the Board was
directed to make regulations governing the exercise of these
powers.' I Since 1934 these functions have devolved in turn upon
the Minister of Munitions, the President of the Board of Trade, the
Minister of Fuel and Power, the Minister of Technology, and finally,
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry' 2 (all hereinafter
referred to as "the Secretary"). Accordingly, after the passage of the
Continental Shelf Act 1964 the Secretary could exercise a very wide
discretion in the granting of offshore exploration and production
licences.
On May 12, 1964, regulations were promulgated dealing with offshore oil and gas operations.' ' These regulations were applicable to
territorial waters as well as to designated areas beyond." 4 They
remained in force until August 8, 1966, when new regulations were
licensing to date is contained in the First Report from the Committee of Public Accounts,
North Sea Oil and Gas (1973).
45. Near Slochteren, about 12 miles inland from the North Sea Coast.
46. Continental Shelf Act 1964, c. 29.
47. Id. § 1(1).
48. Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 36.
49. Continental Shelf Act 1964, c. 29, § 1(3).
50. Id. § 2.
51. Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5,c. 36, § 6.
52. Southam, A Survey of the Law Relating to the Exploration, Transmission and
Distribution of Natural Gas from the Continental Shelf of the United Kingdom, 4 Natural
Resources Lawyer 841, 843 (1971).
53. Petroleum (Production) (Continental Shelf and Territorial Sea) Regulations 1964,
Stat. Instr. 1964, No. 708.
54. Id. § 3.
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adopted to govern both onshore and offshore petroleum operations.' I These regulations, as amended in 197 1, s

6

are still in force.

The regulations go no further than required by statute. They
define the areas in which they operate,' ' the persons entitled to
apply for licences,' 8 the method by which the Secretary shall designate the size of offshore licences," 9 the form of applications for
licences, 6 0 and the fees to be paid upon making such applications.6
Model clauses to be incorporated in licences are listed in schedules to
the regulations, but the Secretary retains the right to modify or
exclude any of these clauses in any particular case.6 2
For ease of administration, the territorial seabed of Great Britain
and designated areas of the continental shelf have been divided into
rectangular blocks,6 3 each of approximately 250 square kilometres
(100 square miles). 6 Production
licences may be issued in repect of
4
one or more blocks.
In view of the Secretary's broad discretion in allocating offshore
production licences, the criteria applied in evaluating applications
assume critical importance. For the first round of licensing in 1964,
these were stated as follows:
First, the need to encourage the most rapid and thorough exploration and economical exploitation of petroleum resources on the

continental shelf. Second, the requirement that the applicant for a
licence shall be incorporated in the United Kingdom and the profits
of the operations shall be taxed here. Thirdly, in cases where the
applicant is a foreign-owned concern, how far British oil companies
receive equitable treatment in that country. Fourthly, we shall look
at the programme of work of the applicant and also at the ability

and resources to implement it. Fifthly, we shall look at the contributions the applicant has already made and is making towards the
development of resources of our continental shelf and the development of our fuel economy generally. 65
Prior to the second round in 1965, there was a review of policy
considerations 6 6 and three further selection criteria were added:
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1966, Stat. Instr. 1966, No. 898.
Stat. Instr. 1971, No. 814.
Stat. Instr. 1966, No. 898, § 3.
Id. § 4.
Id. § 7.
Id.§ 5.
Id. § 11.

62. Id. § 10.
63. A block measures 12 degrees of longitude by 10 degrees of latitude.

64. Stat. Instr. 1966, No. 898, § 7.
65. 692 Parl Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 897 (1964).
66. In the general election of October 1964, a new government (Labour) was elected to
office.
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(i) any exploration work already done by or on behalf of the
applicant which was relevant to the areas applied for, and his facilities for disposing, in the U.K., of any oil or gas won;
(ii) the contribution the applicant had made or was planning to
make to our economic prosperity, including the strengthening of the
United Kingdom balance of payments and the growth of industry
and employment in the United Kingdom, with particular reference
to regional considerations; and

(iii) any proposals which may be made for facilitating particpation
by public enterprise in the development
and exploitation of the
6
resources of the continental shelf. 7

Shortly after the second round was completed, the announcement
was made of the first commerical discovery of gas in the United
Kingdom sector of the North Sea. 6 8 Between then and the end of
1967 three further significant gas fields were discovered. 6 9 A more
detailed policy review was therefore instituted. 7
The decisions
eventually reached were influenced by the stipulations in the Continental Shelf Act that gas could not be used in Great Britain without
the consent of the Secretary. Where gas is to be used as fuel, that
consent is not obtainable unless the nationalized gas industry has
been given a prior oppotunity to purchase it "at a reasonable
price".'
The government's stated view at the time was that the
price should be fixed as low as possible consistent with encouraging
exploration, and it was felt that this provided a means of ensuring

that the country as a whole shared fully in the benefits of North Sea

gas. 7 2 The expectations then were that offshore discoveries would be
of gas rather than oil. The allocation process was therefore left
unchanged, except that participation by publicly-owned corporations

was stressed.73 The third round of licensing was held in 1969-70.
For the fourth and most recent round of licensing, the criterion of
67. 716 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1579 (1965).
68. 24 November 1965, by British Petroleum. This later became known as the West Sole
field.
69. Leman Bank, Indefatigable and Hewett fields.
70. Memorandum of the Department of Trade and Industry to the Committee of Public
Accounts, October 1972,published in North Sea Oil and Gas, supra note 44, at 27.
71. Continental Shelf Act, 1964, c. 29, § 9; North Sea Oil and Gas, supra note 44, at 28.
72. North Sea Oil and Gas, supra note 44, at 28.
73. For future licences in the Irish Sea, it would be a "stringent criterion" that applications provide for participation by the Gas Council or the National Coal Board, through
direct partnership or options or other acceptable arrangements agreed to by the parties. The
government would also welcome an application whereby the Gas Council would act as
operator in a limited area of the North Sea, in order to gain experience for a more active
role in future developments on the U.K. continental shelf. For licences in the North Sea,
criteria similar to those adopted in the second round would be used, with added preference
for groups involving the Gas Council, the National Coal Board and other British interests.
1699 Parl Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1735 (1969).
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participation by puclicly-owned corporations was dropped altogether."
The Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1966 were
amended to allow cash bonus bidding for specified areas,'7 and this
method of allocation was used on an experimental basis for 15
blocks. For the great majority of blocks offered, however, the discretionary allocation system was retained, and the selection criteria
announced by the Secretary differed little from those used in the
first round in 1964.76 By this stage, though, expectations for the
North Sea had progressed beyond gas to oil: a substantial strike had
been announced in the Norwegian sector, 7 and four discoveries had
also been made on the U.K. side of the median line.7 8 Together,
these finds suggested the presence of a significant oil-producing
basin.'9
One of the difficulties inherent in the discretionary allocation
process is selection among applicants for the one licence, when all
have fulfilled the applicable criteria.8 0 The procedure adopted has
been described by the Department of Trade and Industry in the
following terms:
We also look at the scale of applications by a particular company or
group, their spread, their commitment and desire to be committed
to the exploration of the area, and we try to be scrupulously fair, if

the criteria are met, in judging between applicants and in trying to
establish, so to speak, a satisfaction factor, looking at the application

as a whole to see that they have got a reasonable spread as against
other companies with a comparable number of applications, or
smaller or larger. Judgements come into it but we try to refine these
as far as possible. There has to my knowledge been one complaint,
and that complaint was not pressed, out of the total four rounds so
far. 81
In the third round of licensing, when comparatively few blocks
were offered by the government, there were a large number of overlapping applications. In this instance, the selection problem was
74. This followed another change in government; the Conservative Party was returned to
office in the general election of 1970.
75. Petroleum (Production) (Amendment) Regulations 1971.
76. See London Gazette, June 22, 1971.
77. Ekofisk field.
78. Gas Council/Amoco (Montrose), Phillips (Josephine), B.P. (Forties), Shell/Esso
(Auk).
79. Memorandum, supra note 70, at North Sea Oil and Gas, supra note 44, at 30.
80. This problem, and the means adopted for resolving it, are disucssed in detail by Dam,
supra note 44.
81. Sir Robert Marshall, K.C.B., M.B.E., Secretary (Industry), Department of Trade and
Industry, in evidence before the Committee of Public Accounts, 13 December 1972; published in North Sea Oil and Gas, supra note 44, at 74.
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solved by persuading some applicants to join together in larger
consortia. In doing so, the government was motivated by the desire
to prevent any financial and technical resources from being diverted
away from the United Kingdom offshore area.8 2
It is evident that the work programme offered by applicants was
of considerable importance in the allocation of licenses. There has
been no attempt to establish a system of competitive bidding based
on work commitments, but blocks have been graded according to
prospects, and applicants informed that greater exploration effort
would be required in respect of the more highly-rated areas. Work
programmes have taken the form of a commitment to drill exploratory wells (together with conducting preliminary seismic and other
geophysical work) rather than the expenditure of specified sums of
money. However, the obligation to perform such operations is not
absolute: the licenceholder retains the option of surrendering his
licence and thereby relieving himself of any work obligations thereunder.8 3
The results of the four rounds of licensing are summarized in
Table 1.
The consideration payble upon the award of a production licence,
other than the tender price in the case of licences allocated by
competitive bidding, is made up of rentals and royalties. Rentals
consist of an intital payment in respect of the first six years of the
licence term, and thereafter an annual payment which increases up to
a fixed maximum.8 4
The royalty payable on all production is 1212 per cent of wellhead
value. All rentals payable in the seventh and subsequent years of
licence term may be deducted from royalties paid on production.
The term of an offshore production licence is set out in Clause 3
of the Model Clauses, 8" and initially is 6 years. Clause 5 of the
Model Clauses gives a licenceholder the option, subject to due performance of the conditions of the licence, to continue the licence in
force for a further 40 years in respect of not more than half of the
original licence area. In 1970, when the initial term of licences
82. Id.
83. Memorandum, supra note 70, at North Sea Oil and Gas, supra note 44, at 51. This is
not the case with licences granted in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea, where work
commitments are absolute.
84. Initial payments were 25 pounds per square kilometre for the first and second
rounds, 30 pounds for the third round, and 45 pounds for the fourth round. Maximum
rental was 290 pounds per square kilometre for the first and second rounds, and 350 pounds
for the third and fourth rounds.
85. Stat. Instr. 1966, No. 898, sched. 4.
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granted in the first round expired, 77 per cent of the total licence
area was returned to the Crown." 6
Applicants for production licences must be persons who are
citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and are resident in the
United Kingdom, or corporations incorporated in the United Kingdom.' 7 In practice this has not placed any obstacle in the way of
foreign particpation. The reason for the restriction seems to be to
ensure that all licenceholders are residents of the United Kingdom
and are subject to its income tax laws in that capacity.
Preliminary exploration for offshore oil and gas is provided for
through a system of non-exclusive exploration licences which permit
geological and geophysical surveys and, with the prior consent of the
Secretary, shallow exploratory drilling. The holder of an exploration
licence is required to keep in the United Kingdom accurate records
of all information obtained from exploration operations, both
geological and geophysical, and to furnish such information to the
Secretary from time to time. This information is to be treated as
confidential, within prescribed limits.8 8 It is interpreted by the
Department of Trade and Industry, with the assistance of the Institute of Geological Sciences, and used in the formulation of work
programmes for prospective licence areas. 8 9
C. Canada
The allocation of federal offshore oil and gas rights in Canada is
governed by the Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations,9 0 made
under the Territorial Lands Act 9' and the public Lands Grants
Act. 9 2 The regulations are applicable to the Yukon Territory and the
Northwest Territories as well as to submerged lands within federal
jurisdiction. Thus there is no separate system with respect to offshore areas. The administration of the regulations is divided between
the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, with the former given
responsibility for the lands north of the 60th parallel and the
northern offshore areas, and the latter the east and west coast off9 3
shore areas including Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait.
86. North Sea Oil and Gas, supra note 44, at 73.
87. Stat. Instr. 1966, No. 898, § 4.
88. Id., sched. 5; see 1971 amendments, supra note 75.
89. Memorandum,supra note 70, at North Sea Oil and Gas, supra note 44, at 49.
90. Statutory Orders and Regulations (SOR) 61-252, as amended by SOR/63-91, 64-436,
66-156, 66-363, 66-486, 66-569, 67-343, 67-379, 67-614, 68-368, 69-29, 69-415, 71-662
and 73-13.
91. Can. Rev. Stat. c. T-6 (1970).
92. Can. Rev. Stat. c. P-29 (1970).
93. Privy Council (P.C.) 1965-2284 (SOR/66-9).
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The regulations establish a two-stage system of oil and gas titles.
The first of these is represented by the exploratory permit which
affords the holder the right to conduct comprehensive exploration
operations including deep-test drilling within the area covered by the
permit. The second stage is represented by the oil and gas lease which
allows production from within the lease area. An important feature
of the two-stage system is the entitlement of a permitholder to select
a lease from within the permit area. In addition, the regulations
provide for preliminary exploration operations including geological
and geophysical examinations, aerial mapping and shallowtest
drilling.9 An exploratory licence is required for these activities. The
rights obtained under a licence are non-exclusive, and extend to areas
subject to permit or lease. 9 I
Permits are issued by the minister of the relevant department. The
regulations prescribe two different procedures to be followed,
according to whether or not the subject area has previously been held
under permit or lease. Where the area has not been so held, the
minister may issue a permit simply upon application made in accordance with the regulations, provided he is satisfied that exploratory work will be carried out in the permit area.9 6 It seems that the
minister has a discretion in deciding whether or not to issue a permit
to a qualified applicant. This discretion has been exercised to withdraw general areas from application; in January 197 1, the Minister
for Energy, Mines, and Resources announced that no further permits
would be issued in the Georgia Strait region between Vancouver
Island and mainland British Columbia, and this ban was later
extended to the entire west coast offshore area. Apart from this,
however, the practice of issuing permits to qualified applicants has
been followed on a "first-come, first-served" basis, and industry has
come to expect this as a matter of course. 9 7
The first offshore permits were issued in 1958 when Richfield 9 8
obtained 1.3 million acres off the west coast. Shell followed in 1961
with 11.5 million acres. 9 9 Current west coast permits cover 16
million acres. 1 00 Mobil was first off the east coast with 1.1 million
94. Up to 1000 feet.
95. Canada Oil & Gas Land Regulations, § § 23-27.
96. Id. § 30.
97. This is demonstrated by the fact that, despite the west coast "ban," companies have
continued to file applications for permits in the area, presumably on the understanding that
priority will be given to such applications should the ban be lifted.
98. Now part of Atlantic Richfield.
99. Killey, Drillingand Service Contracts in Offshore Oil and Gas Operations, 11 Alberta
L. Rev. 480, 481 (1973).
100. Canadian Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, Resource Management and
Conservation Branch, Offshore Oil and Gas Permits (1971).
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acres of permits on and adjacent to Sable Island in 1960. Again Shell
followed with 20 million acres on the Scotian Shelf in 1963, and the
next year Amoco and Imperial obtained 45 million acres on the
Grand Banks.' 01 There are presently 284 million acres of permits in
force off the east coast.' 02 Activity in Hudson Bay commenced in
1963, and existing permits cover 38 million acres.' 03 Interest in
northern offshore regions was slight until the Prudhoe Bay discovery
in 1968, after which permits were rapidly acquired.' 04 A substantial
permitholder in the Arctic Island is Panarctic Oils, the equity of
which is 45 per cent owned by the Canadian government. The
present position is that virtually all prospective offshore regions are
subject to existing permits, including areas where water depths are
considerable.'

0 5

Before the minister may issue a permit over lands that have
previously been held under permit or lease he must call tenders. An
invitation to tender must be advertised and state the terms and con
ditions upon which the permit will be issued. These may include
either a cash bonus or an exploratory work bonus; in the latter case,
the applicant undertakes to spend a fixed sum on approved exploration activities within the permit area. 06 The minister may decline
to accept any tender. If no tenders are received the minister may in
the future issue a permit upon application.' 07
There are few instances of the allocation of offshore permits by
tender. In areas under the administration of the Department of
Energy, Mines, and Resources only one case is recorded. The blocks
in question, which were to the south of Newfoundland in the vicinity
of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, had not previously been
subject to permit or lease but were specially designated as such by
Order in Council.' 0 On December 24, 1966, an invitation to tender
101.
102.
103.
104.

Killey, supra note 99, at 481, 482.
Offshore Oil and Gas Permits, supra note 100.
Id.
Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Oil and Gas

North of 60 degrees (1970).
105. Permits cover 775 million acres offshore: Minutes of Proceedings& Evidence Before
the House of Commons Standing Comm. on External Affairs & Nat'! Defence, 29th Parl.,
1st Sess., Nos. 26 & 27 (Austl. 1973). Water depths range-up to 3,700 metres on the Scotian
Shelf, 3,000 metres on the Grand Banks and 2,600 metres in the Beaufort Sea: D. Crosby,
Aspects of Offshore Mineral Resource Management (paper delivered to the 26th Annual
Conference of The Chemical Institute of Canada, Halifax, June 2, 1971).
106. Oil & Gas Land Order No. 1-1962, SOR/62-367, as amended by SOR/65-26,
67-263, and 69-53.
107. Canada Oil & Gas Land Regulations., § 32.
108. SOR/66-486, October 27, 1966. This procedure was followed to induce companies
to acquire permits in the area, which was subject to a jurisdictional dispute between Canada
and France.
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permits was advertised in the Canada Gazette" 09 Bids were sought
in the form of exploratory work commitments rather than cash
bonuses. The exploratory work was to be performed during the intial
term of the permits and was in addition to usual work requirements.
Twenty blocks were offered, each of approximately 540,000
acres.'1 0 Bids were received on eleven of these, and in each case
Gulf was the high bidder. The successful bids amounted to
$4,200,538.13 in work commitments. The day after the bids were
opened, Mobil obtained permits over six of the remaining blocks by
application to the Department.
In January 1969, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development issued permits by tender in the Beaufort Sea. The areas
offered were from surrendered permits and consisted of five parcels
covering a total of 1,151,169 acres. 1 1 Again, work commitment
bidding was used. Bids were received on all blocks, and high bids
amounted to $15,491,561.64. Individual bidders won two blocks
while joint ventures were successful in three. Later, all the successful
bidders pooled their acreage and formed the Beaufort Sea Work
Bonus Group, for which Gulf is the operator.' 2
A permit may cover one grid area or one-half of a grid area.' 1 3
These range in size from less than 64,000 acres off the northern tip
of Labrador to more than 95,000 acres south of Nova Scotia.' 14
The term of offshore permits is normally six years,' 1 ' and renewals
are available for successive periods of one year, up to a limit of
six.

1

16

The holder of a permit is required to carry out exploration work
during the permit term. Schedule B to the regulations sets out the
109. Canada Gazette, Dec. 24, 1966 (Part I) at 4080,4081.
110. Each block comprised 6 permit areas.
111. Details of the blocks areas follows:
46-69: 6 permit areas containing 248,614 acres
47-69: 4 permit areas containing 135,338 acres
48-69: 6 permit areas containing 245,004 acres
49-69: 3 permit areas contining 261,456 acres
50-69: 3 permit areas contining 260,757 acres
112. This was influenced by a provision in the invitation for tender allowing permits in
all blocks to be grouped for the purpose of fulfilling work bonus tenders.
113. Canada Oil & Gas Land Regulations, § 33. A grid area south of the 70th parallel is
bounded by lines of latitude 10 minutes apart and lines of longitude 15 minutes apart,
whereas north of 70 it is bounded by lines of latitude 10 minutes apart and lines of
longitude 30 minutes apart. Grid areas may vary in size owing to the convergence of the
meridians.
114. Crosby, supra note 105.
115. Canada Oil & Gas Land Regulations, § 36. The only exception is that permits north
of 70 which were issued prior to 1968 have a term of 8 years, and if issued before July 1,
1967, also have a free extension of one year.
116. Id. § 38.
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expenditure that must be made within designated periods in order to
fulfill this obligation. Both the timing and the amount of this
expenditure vary slightly according to the location of the permit, but
the total required for the original term and six extensions is approximately $2.70 per acre."' 7 However, this work commitment is not
absolute. A permitholder may surrender his permit at any time and
thereby release himself from obligation for future expenditure. The
total work requirements for offshore permits issued to June 197 1, if
all were to be held for the full term and extensions, amounted to
approximately $1,750 million.' '
Comprehensive disclosure provisions apply to all operations in
offshore areas. Prior notice must be given of any exploration
work.' 1 9 and copies provided to the relevant department of all aerial
photographs, detailed geological, and geophysical reports of any area
investigated, and reports of all other surveys conducted . 2 0 However, there is no requirement to disclose interpretations of exploration data or research conducted on the basis of it. Information supplied is kept confidential for varying periods of time depending on
the nature of the information. 1 21 In the case of drilling results the
period is two years.
The second stage of the allocation process involves the oil and gas
lease. As with permits, there are two methods by which leases may
be acquired. A permitholder is entitled, upon application to the
minister, to the grant of a lease. 22 Such an application may be
made at any time during which the permit is in force. A prior discovery of oil or gas is not required. There is however, one restriction
placed upon this entitlement to a lease. The holder must be either a
Canadian citizen or corporation; in the latter case there are requirements of Canadian shareholding or stock exchange listing.' 2 a Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that this provision will have any substantial
effect upon the high degree of foreign ownership of oil and gas
operations in Canada.' 24
The maximum area included in a lease is one-half of the original

117. Permits may be "grouped" to allow excess expenditure on one to be distributed
among others.
118. Crosby, supra note 105.
119. Canada Oil & Gas Land Regulations, § 52.
120. Id. § § 28, 54, 106.
121. Id. § 107.
122. Id. § 55 (1).
123. Id., § 55(2) (amended 1973).
124. Thompson, Sovereignty and Natural Resources-A Study of Canadian Petroleum
Legislation, 4 U.B.C.L. Rev. 161, 170 (1970).
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permit area;1 2 5 the remainder reverts to the Crown.' 26 The permit
holder may select the area to be included subject to certain
restrictions. The regulations divide each grid area into 60, 80 or 100
rectangular sections, depending upon geographical location.' 27 The
lease area must consist of quadrilateral blocks of sections of specified
size;' 2 8 selected blocks must comer one another, giving rise to a
chequer-board pattern, or be separated from one another by a
corridor with a width of at least one section. 29
Clearly, the objective of such a procedure is to allow the Crown to
share in the rewards of offshore exploration by recovering at least 50
percent of each permit area, including some sections with reasonable
proximity to any discovery site. Nevertheless, on October 12, 1961,
an Order in Council was made which ran counter to this
objective. 30 The effect of this order was to give the holder of a
permit who had selected a lease a preferential right for 60 days to
apply to the minister for the grant of a further lease over that part of
the permit area which had been surrendered to the Crown. The
consideration payable in respect of this grant was an additional
royalty upon production from the further lease.' '
In 1970, the order was revoked' 32 before it had been used by any
offshore permitholders. This revocation drew strong opposition from
industry, and the federal government undertook to review
procedures governing lease selections and generally to revise the
regulations. This revision is still in progress. Few offshore leases
appear to have been granted yet,' 13 although applications have been
lodged by a number of permitholders pending completion of the
revision. 3"

The second method of allocating oil and gas leases is used in
relation to areas that have previously been held under a permit or
lease which has expired, been cancelled, or been surrendered. In this
125. Canada Oil & Gas Land Regulations, § 46.
126. Id. § 61(1).
127. Id. § 7. The area of a section is approximately one square mile.
128. Blocks must be not larger than five sections by three sections or four sections by
four sections if the full entitlement of 50% of the permit area is requested; however, they
may measure six sections by three sections if not more than 40% of the original permit area
is applied for.
129. Canada Oil & Gas Land Regulations, § 60.
130. Oil & Gas Land Order No. 1-1961, SOR/61-461 as amended by SOR/61-540.
131. Between 5% and 10% for oil, depending on rate of production; 5% for gas.
132. SOR/70-184.
133. Imperial has gone to lease on six permits in the Mackenzie Delta, some of which
extend into the Beaufort Sea: Oilweek, April 17, 1972, at 8.
134. Mobil-Tetco has applied for leases on the Scotian Shelf in the vicinity of Sable
Island. Teneco has also applied for leases on a permit area in the Gulf of St. Lawrence:
Oilweek, May 29, 1972.
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case the minister is given a very broad discretion. As noted
earlier,' ' s he may call tenders for the acquisition of permits. On the
other hand, he may invite tenders for the purchase of leases or may
grant leases without first calling tenders.' 1 6 The terms and
conditions upon which such leases are granted are also within the
discretion of the minister; presumably, he may require payment of a
cash bonus, an undertaking to carry out specified work in the lease
area, payment of a bonus royalty on production, or any combination
of these. 7
The consideration payable in exchange for a lease, apart from
tender price where applicable, consists of an annual rental and a
royalty upon production. The rental for the first year is 50 cents per
acre of land under lease, and for subsequent years is a dollar per
acre.' 3 s The basic royalty rate upon offshore production of oil or
gas is 10 percent. During the early years of the lease term, though,
this rate is reduced to 5 percent. 1 3 9 Furthermore, the Governor in
Council may reduce the royalty rate at any time if he is of the
opinion that a reduction would prolong commercial production. 140
The royalty paid during any year may be deducted from the rental
payable for the succeeding year. 4 '
Decisions concerning the development of a lease area may not be
left entirely to the leaseholder. The minister may require the drilling
of a well at any time after the expiry of the first three years of the
lease term, and if that well is not capable of commercial production,
he may order the leaseholder to drill another well one year after
abandonment or completion of the first. Where there is commercial
production the leaseholder may be ordered to drill further
development wells and to continue production for as long as it is
commercially possible to do so.' 4 2
The primary term of a lease is 21 years."'4 However, a lease shall
135. See text accompanying note 106, supra.
136. Canada Oil & Gas Land Regulations, § 58.
137. Crosby, supra note 105.
138. Canada Oil & Gas Land Regulations, § § 79-81, 91. After the first year of the lease
term and the discovery of oil or gas in commercial quantities, the rental may be reduced by
up to 50% until commercial production begins. Credits allowed against rental are (a) excess
allowable expenditures incurred on the permit area before the granting of the lease, and (b)
allowable expenditures on exploration work after the lease is granted. Moreover, grouping of
leases is available in order to derive maximum benefits from these credits.
139. Id. § 86. The period during which this reduced rate applies is the first five years of
commercial production, or the first 36 months, in aggregate, during which oil or gas is
produced, whichever is the shorter.
140. Id. § 88.
141. Id. § 85.
142. Id. § § 89,90,94.
143. Id. § 61.
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be renewed for successive periods of 21 years so long as the area is, in
the opinion of the minister, capable of producing oil and gas and
there has been compliance with the terms of the lease and
regulations.' 4 ' A renewed lease is subject to such terms and
conditions, including royalty, as the minister may order and to the
regulations in force at the date or renewal." ' Nevertheless, when
commercial production begins from a lease area the holder is entitled
to have the lease reissued for a new term of 21 years from the date of
commencement of commercial production, with the same royalty as
that payable under the original lease. 1 '6 This provision has the
effect of entrenching the existing royalty rates for as long as 42 years
after the granting of a lease.
D. Australia
Offshore exploration for oil and gas was of little importance in
Australia until 1960, when The Broken Hill Proprietary Co., Ltd.
(BHP) acquired offshore exploration titles covering approximately
66,000 square miles from the South Australian, Tasmanian and
Victorian governments."4' At this stage there was no federal
legislation governing offshore oil and gas operations, but BHP's
action imparted a new urgency to the question of jurisdiction in
these areas.
In 1962, negotiations began between the federal government and
the states to resolve the conflict. In 1967 an agreement was
reached. 48 Its main features were that the federal and state
governments undertook to legislate with respect to offshore oil and
gas operations in identical terms, and to refrain from amending such
legislation without prior unanimous agreement. Moreover, the
governments agreed not to make, amend or repeal regulations under
the legislation except in accordance with a prior agreement to do so.
The Australian territorial seabed and continental shelf were divided
by the agreement into "adjacent areas," one appertaining to each
state or coastal territory. The federal legislation is applicable to all
adjacent areas, whereas each state statute applies only to the offshore
area adjacent to its coast.
144. Id. § 63.
145. Id. § 81.
146. Id. § 64.
147. Senate Select Comm. on Off-Shore Petroleum Resources, Report, para. 3.26 (Austl.
1971).
148. Its full title is Agreement relating to the Exploration for, and the Exploitation of,
the Petroleum Resources, and certain other Resources, of the Continental Shelf of Australia
and of Certain Territories of the Commonwealth and of certain other Submerged Land. It
was executed on October 16, 1967.
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The principal statute enacted the Federal Parliament in accordance
with the terms of the agreement is the Petroleum (Submerged Lands)
Act 1967.1 9 Together with corresponding state legislation, it
establishes a single code of oil and gas law applicable throughout the
adjacent areas. Both federal and state legislation is administered in
each area by a "Designated Authority" ' s who in the case of the
states is the Minister for Mines.
To simplify administration, the adjacent areas are divided into
graticular blocks, each measuring five minutes of latitude by five
minutes of longitude.' "' The area of blocks varies from 23 square
miles in the south to 30 square miles in the north.
As in Canada, the Submerged Lands Acts establish a two-stage
system of offshore oil and gas titles. The first stage is represented by
the exploration permit, the second by the production licence. In
contrast to all the other countries, though, no provision is made for
preliminary exploration.
The power to grant exploration permits is vested in the Designated
Authority.! 2 The allocation process is discretionary. The first step
is for the Designated Authority to invite, by public notice,
applications for permits over specified blocks.! s' Each application
must be accompanied by particulars of the proposed work
programme, expenditure, technical abilities, and financial resources
of the applicant.' " Where an application is made in respect of a
block that previously formed part of a production licence or location,' 5 there is provision for a limited degree of competitive bidding as applications must also specify the amount that the applicant
is prepared to pay for the permit.! 5 6 Nevertheless, the discretion of
the Designated Authority is still very wide; there is no requirement
that the highest bidder be awarded the permit. In the case in which,
following an invitation for applications, no permit is granted over an
area, the Designated Authority may in the future issue permits without further public invitation or notice.' 1
149. No. 118 of 1967; amended by the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1968, No. 1
of 1968, This Act, together with corresponding state statues, shall hereafter be referred to as
the Submerged Lands Acts.
150. Agreement, supra note 148, part III.
151. Submerged Lands Acts, § 17.
152. Prior consultation is required with the federal government which may exercise a
power of veto if the proposed action affects one of its specified constitutional functions:
Agreement supra note 148, cl.11.
153. Submerged Lands Acts, § 20(1).
154. Id. § 21(1).
155. See text accompanying notes 173-174, infra.
156. Submerged Lands Acts, § 23(4)(d).
157. Id. § 20(3).
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In practice there has been little opportunity for the Designated
Authorities to issue exploration permits. On April 1, 1968, when the
Submerged Lands Acts were proclaimed, the offshore area subject to
previously-issued exploration titles was 743,803 square miles, about
75 percent of the total.' I Most of these titles have been replaced
by new permits pursuant to the transitional provisions of the Submerged Lands Acts' s 9 and these will remain in force until at least
1974.
In the cases in which permits have been issued, the Designated
Authorities in different states have expercised their powers in different ways. In New South Wales, no transitional permits were issued
because all previously-granted titles had expired before the Submerged Lands Acts came into force. In 1969, the Designated Authority published a notice inviting applications for permits in respect of
the entire adjacent area, and permits have since been issued by the
Designated Authority in response to applications filed from time to
time.' 60 In Queensland there were several transitional permits
issued. In October 1968, when the Designated Authority invited
applications for further permits, approximately 40 percent of the
adjacent area was withheld. Proposed permit areas made up a
chequerboard pattern and ranged in size from 33 blocks in highly
prospective areas to 387 in regions considered unpromising. The
reason for withholding a large section of the adjacent area was to
enable better decisions to be made in the future based on experience
gained in the first allocation round. Queensland received 41 applications for permits, 19 in respect of one area, 11 for another, and none
for seven of the areas offered.'61 In the end all were rejected as
exploration was halted pending the report of the Great Barrier Reef
Petroleum Drilling Royal Commissions.
A permit is granted subject to such conditions as the Designated
Authority thinks fit and specifies in the permit.' 6 2 Of great importance are those specifying the work programme and expenditure
commitment.' 6 These are determined by negotiation between the
Designated Authority and the applicant for a permit before the permit is granted, and when there are several applicants for a permit
over one area, proposed work programmes and expenditures may
158. Report, supra note 147, para. 10.45.
159. Submerged Lands Acts, Part III, Div. 7, § § 141-149.
160. Report, supra note 147, para 7.57.

161. Id., paras. 10.74-80.
162. Submerged Lands Acts, § 31(1).

163. Id. § 31(2).
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determine which applicant is successful. Security must be lodged for
compliance with such conditions.'64
The maximum permit area is 400 blocks, the minimum 16
blocks.' 65 There is no restriction upon the number of permits that
may be held by any one person.
The term of a permit is six years. In addition, a permit may be
renewed for successive periods of five years, as of right if the holder
has complied with its conditions and the requirements of the Submerged Lands Acts.' 66 However, upon each renewal, a permit
holder must surrender at least half the number of blocks covered by
the permit. Renewed permits
must consist of discrete areas each
1
comprising at least 16 blocks. 67
The Submerged Lands Acts require the holder of a permit to
furnish to the Designated Authority "information or ....documents

relating to petroleum exploration operations.' 1 6 This has been
interpreted by the Chairman of the Australian Petroleum Exploration Association to include not only exploration data but also interpretations of it and related research.' 69 However, restrictions are
placed upon the right of the Designated Authority to publish this
information.1 70
Since 1957 the federal government has subsidized certain exploration operations under the Petroleum Search Subsidy Scheme.' "
The scheme extended to exploration drilling and geophysical survey
work carried on outside the region of existing production areas. The
applicant for subsidy first obtained the approval of the Minister for
National Development for the proposed operations and then entered
into an agreement with the Minister for payment of the subsidy. In
the event of a commercial discovery the subsidy was repayable. The
normal subsidy rate was 30 percent of the cost of the approved
operations, but in 1969 this was reduced in the case of permitholders
with less than 51 percent Australian equity ownership. Total subsidies paid to March 1974 were $136.6 million. Recently the federal
government announced the termination of the scheme to take effect
in July 1974.
Oil and gas may be produced commercially offshore only by the
164. Id. § § 22(1), 114.

165. Id. § 21.
166. Id.

167. Id. § 31.
168. Id. § 115.
169. Report, supra note 147,-para. 7,92.
170. Submerged Lands Acts, § 118.
171. Petroleum Search Subsidy Act, 1957, No. 90 of 1957: amended by No. 60 of 1959,
No. 74 of 1961, No. 57 of 1964, No. 43 of 1967,and No. 38 of 1969.
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holder of a production licence. There are two methods by which a
licence may be obtained. A permitholder who discovers oil or gas
within the permit area is entitled as of right to the grant of a licence
in respect of the discovery. 1 7 2 The procedure by which the licence
area is selected is rather complex. The permitholder may nominate a
block to form the centre of a location to be declared in respect of
the discovery well.' 73 A location is a group of nine blocks, three
blocks square. Once a location has been declared, the permitholder is
given an option in the selection of the licence area. The first course
open is to apply for a licence covering any five of the nine blocks in
the location,' 74 in which case the standard royalty rate of 10 percent is charged.' 7 1 The second course is to apply for a licence over
more than five blocks.' 7 6 The applicable royalty rate is then determined by the Designated Authority between 11 percent and 12'/2
percent.' 7 Any blocks within a location not selected to form part
of the licence area revert to the Crown.' 7 8
The second method of allocating licences involves competitive
bidding. It applies to blocks which previously formed part of a location or licence and have reverted to the Crown. If the Designated
Authority is of the opinion that there is oil or gas within the blocks,
he may use this procedure. Both cash bonus bidding and royalty
bidding are allowed. The Designated Authority may accept or reject
any bid, in his discretion.' '9
To 1971, four production licences had been granted, each in
respect of a discovery by the permitholder, BHP.' 80 The four fields
are Barracouta, Marlin, Halibut, and Kingfish, all in the Gippsland
Basin off the coast of Victoria. BHP selected licences covering the
entire location in each case. The applicable royalty rates are 11 percent (Barracouta and Marlin) and 12'/2 percent (Halibut and Kingfish).' 81
The Designated Authority is empowered to reduce the royalty rate
where the rate of recovery of oil and gas has fallen to the point
where further recovery would be uneconomic at the applicable
172. Submerged Lands Acts, § 43.

173. Id. § 36.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. § 40(1).
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Royalty) Act 1967, No. 119 of 1967, § 5.
Submerged Lands Acts, § 40(3).
Id. § 42.

178. Id. § 46.
179. Id. § 47.
180. Under a joint venture agreement between BHP and Esso, the latter is entitled to a
50% interest in each of these licences.
181. Report, supra note 147, paras. 9.173-174.
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rate. 1 8 2 Apart from royalties, a licenceholder must pay an annual
rental to the Designated Authority at the rate of $3,000 per block
included in a licence area.' 83
The term of a licence is 21 years. Where a licence holder has
complied with the conditions of the licence and the provisions of the
Submerged Lands Acts, there is a renewal as of right for a further 21
years, and in the discretion of the Designated Authority for additional periods not exceeding 21 years.' 84 The royalty rate applicable
to a licence granted by way of renewal is that in force at the date of
renewal.' 85
A licence is granted subject to such conditions as the Designated
Authority thinks fit and specifies in the licence.' 6 However, two
important conditions are specified in the Submerged Lands Acts. The
first of these is the annual expenditure requirement, at the rate of
$100,000 per block. The value of oil and gas produced from the
licence area in the preceding year may be deducted from this
figure.1 8 7 The second is the power of the Designated Authority to
control, within his discretion, the rate of production of oil and gas
from any licence area. 188
ASSESSMENT OF THE ALLOCATION SYSTEMS
A. Management Objectives
A necessary prerequisite for an assessment of the different allocation systems is the establishment of a set of criteria against which the
systems may be judged. Ideally, these criteria would consist of the
objectives announced by the governments for their offshore oil and
gas regimes.
In the United States the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act does
not list the objectives to be attained. However, Public Law 88-606,
which established the Public Land Law Review Commission to study
existing laws relating to the administration of the public lands of the
United States, declared it to be the policy of Congress that "the
public lands of the United States shall be (a) retained and managed
or (b) disposed of, all in a manner to provide the maximum benefit
for the general public."' 89 In the United Kingdom, government
182. Petroleum (Submerged Lands (Royalty) Act, § 6.
183. Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Production Licence Fees) Act 1967, No. 121 of

1967, § 4.

184. Submerged Lands Acts, § § 53-55.
185. Petroleum (Submerged Lands) (Royalty) Act, § 5.
186. Submerged Lands Acts, § .56.
187. Id. § 57(4).
188. Id. § 58.
189. 43 U.S.C. § § 1391-1400 (1971). This broad goal has not been officially translated
into a set of more specific objectives so far as the outer continental shelf lands are con-
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objectives may be gleaned from the selection criteria announced for
each licensing round.' 90 It would appear that the principal consideration has been speed-the most rapid exploration and development
of offshore areas-in order that dependence upon foreign supplies
may be reduced and the nation's balance of payments position improved. A further objective of some importance has been participation by British interests in offshore activities. Specific government
objectives in Canada and Australia are difficult to identify. All that
can be said is that governments in both countries have been anxious
to encourage exploration, often in remote and underdeveloped
regions.
The feature that is common to all these objectives is the public
benefit, as conceived by different governments in different circumstances. This flows naturally from the fact that offshore oil and gas
resources are the subject of extensive public ownership or control.
But what should a government do to promote the public benefit? It
is suggested that a government has two essential functions to fulfill.
First, it must act as the arbiter of social values, establishing and
maintaining a set of policies which resolve those issues of choice that
are inadequately dealt with by a free market economy. Second, it
must act within the framework of these policies like a private owner
of resources and seek to maximize their present economic value.
Several of the more specific policy objectives identified with respect to the United States demonstrate the government's role in
placing social values upon certain non-market benefits and costs.' 9'
These include the encouragement of private participation, the procerned. However, in 1 OCS Study, supra note 6, at 598-600, the following objectives were
identified:
1. Efficient resource management-the objective of best effecting the prudent
use of resources through their intelligent management by the federal govern-

ment.
2. The encouragement of private participation-the objective of permitting
qualified responsible representatives of the private sector to participate in the
development of outer continental shelf resources.
3. The maximization of revenue to the federal government-the objective of
effecting the greatest direct financial return to the resource owner.
4. The encouragement of multiple use of resources-the objective of co-ordinating management of the various resources and uses of the continental shelf
to minimize conflicts.
5. The advancement of knowledge and the development of technology-the
objective of learning more about the offshore and its resources and achieving
the technological capability to safely permit the scientific exploration and
resource management.
6. The protection of environmental quality-the objective of preserving, and
in some cases restoring, the natural condition of the environment.
190. See notes 65-81, supra & accompanying text.

191. See note 189, supra.
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motion of multiple use of resources, the advancement of knowledge
and the development of technology, and the protection of environmental quality. In the United Kingdom, the concern about balance
of payments and security of supply provides further illustration, as
does the desire in Canada to assist regional economic development.
Perhaps the most important instance of the necessity for such government intervention arises in relation to the timing of oil and gas
exploration and development. It seems unlikely that the time preferences of private entrepreneurs, which take account of imperfections in the capital market, government taxation policies and risk,
will coincide with social time preference determined by society's
attitude towards the future.
The role of a government as arbiter of social values requires that a
management regime for offshore oil and gas resources provide for a
measure of continuing government control over the resources. In
other words, flexibility is essential; the regime should not give rise to
such rigidity that the government can no longer exercise its function
of taking account of social attitudes. An important aspect of this
flexibility is the retention of the option to promote different government policies in the future. The values placed by society upon
various public benefits and costs arising from offshore oil and gas
operations are subject to considerable change from time to time. An
inability to take account of change results in a management regime
which is no longer capable of providing the maximum public benefit.
The second role suggested for the government is to maximize the
present economic value of offshore oil and gas resources. This implies
that the resources should be managed so as to generate economic
rents with the greatest possible present value, where the term
"economic rents" is used to signify all that production revenue
which is in excess of the amount required to induce oil and gas
operations at the socially-desired rate. This role is required in the
interests of economic efficiency. In addition, the economic rents
should be collected in full by the government in its capacity as
resource owner, for only then will the demands of equity be fulfilled.
Moreover, in countries such as the United Kingdon, Canada, and
Australia where foreign participation in offshore oil and gas activities
is significant, economic efficiency, as well as equity, requires that the
government capture the economic rents in full.
The relationship between the two government objectives is important. Flexibility in a management regime may be achieved at the cost
of uncertainty in the private sector, with the result that the level of
investment falls below the desired rate and economic rents are there-
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by reduced. If the private sector is to continue to play a part in the
development of offshore oil and gas resources, it becomes a matter of
reasonable balance to devise a management system which will allow
the required measure of responsiveness to changing circumstances
without unduly affecting private investment. On the other hand,
government policies adopted in response to social values will often
involve a cost in terms of foregone economic rents. This cost should
not be overlooked; it should be an important factor for consideration
when decisions are made on government policies. The four management systems for offshore oil and gas resources will now be
examined in the light of these suggested government objectives.
B. Flexibility
In all cases, flexibility has been sacrificed by allocating private
rights of excessive duration. What is an appropriate term is a difficult
question to answer, as it depends finally upon economic considerations governing offshore oil and gas operations and the value placed
by a government upon the retention of future options in resource
management. Selection of the term also involves economic consequences for the government. If rights are allocated by competitive
sale, the government must give up some present revenue in order to
retain future options. In this regard, however, it is important to
recognize that private enterprise discounts future benefits and costs
in calculating the present value of rights which are offered for sale, so
that after a period of time which will depend upon the private discount rate employed, the present value of the cost to a government
of retaining future options will be small. This period is very much
shorter than the duration of offshore oil and gas rights issued so far
in the four countries; for example, if a discount rate of 15 per cent is
assumed for private enterprise, the present value of large benefits and
costs occurring as close as ten years hence will be a small price for a
government to pay for the opportunity to revise its management
policies at that time. This is not to say that private rights necessarily
should endure for no .longer than ten years, for the time required to
recover investment in offshore oil and gas operations should also be
considered. Nevertheless, it does indicate that existing terms are
quite excessive.
In the United States, a lease continues as long as commercial
production is possible from the area.' 92 This may be more than 30
years. While a case undoubtedly be made for allowing a lessee who
makes a discovery the opportunity to exploit it fully, there seems
192. See text accompanying note 8, supra.
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little reason for the financial terms of the lease, such as rental and
royalty rates, to continue unchanged for the entire period. In the
United Kingdom, a production licence may remain in force for up to
46 years,1 9 3 subject to fixed rental and royalty rates. In Canada the
corresponding period may be up to 42 years from when a production
lease was granted, 1 94 while in Australia it is 21 years.' I
If it often argued that terms of this duration are necessary to
prevent investment uncertainty. However, it is suggested that in
practice the contrary is true. In a world where change is the norm,
the rigidity inherent in such long terms becomes politically and
socially unacceptable. Pressure develops in support of change without regard for the fact that the terms of private rights have not
expired.' 96 The choice therefore lies between terms of shorter
duration within which a review of important conditions is allowed at
specified intervals and government intervention to alter the entire
management system. The former appears less likely to induce investment uncertainty than the latter.
A government's role as arbiter of social values seems more difficult
to fulfill under a two-stage allocation system than under a one-stage
system. In principle this need not be so, but in practice it has proved
to be the case. Under both systems a government is required to
decide, either expressly or implicitly, whether oil and gas production
should be allowed in each particular offshore area and the conditions
to be applicable. In a one-stage system the time at which this decision must be made is clear; it is prior to the allocation of oil and gas
rights. In the United States the decision-making process has been
formalized since the passage of the National Environmental Policy
Act, which ensures that any decision taken is a conscious one
reached after consideration of specified social values.' 17 In a twostage system the question arises whether this decision should be
made before the first stage or the second. There is a natural tendency
for it to be left until the second stage when exploration has produced
greater information about the oil and gas potential of the area in
question. However, this runs counter to the right of conversion from
193. See text accompanying notes 85 & 86, supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 143-146, supra.
195. See text accompanying note 184, supra.
196. Such pressure is clearly evident today in the United Kingdom, Canada and
Australia. In the United States and Australia, constitutional problems may well be encountered by the federal government in abrogating private rights without payment of compensation, but this does not prevent alteration of resource management regimes. Indirect
methods of change, such as income tax amendments, are always available, and there is ample
scope for direct government participation in production or distribution.
197. See text accompanying notes 31 & 32, supra.
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exploration to production title which is characteristic of both the
Canadian and the Australian allocation systems.' 9
A government should therefore decide for or against production
before the first stage, but two matters make a conscious decision at
this point both difficult and unlikely. First, in the past exploration
rights have been issued over very great areas, and second, during the
currency of exploration rights social attitudes towards offshore oil
and gas production may undergo considerable change.
A related issue of great importance illustrates the problem inherent in a two-stage system. In both Canada and Australia there is
considerable difference of opinion concerning the nature and extent
of the right to convert from exploration to production title. For
instance, is this right to be characterized a proprietary or contractual,
or merely legislative and thus capable of removal at any time by
amendment of the governing statute or regulations? If the former be
the case, does the right entrench the financial conditions such as
royalty contained in the statute or regulations at the time when the
exploration title was issued, or may these conditions be altered at
any time prior to the granting of the production title without abrogating acquired rights? The dilemma is obvious. If the right of conversion is proprietary or contractual then a two-stage allocation process
is inflexible from the date when exploration rights are issued;' 99 if
not, there can be little certainty of investment until the production
stage is reached.
The three allocation methods used to date are competitive
bidding, administrative discretion and free entry. It has been argued
in the United Kingdom that administrative discretion provides
greater scope for government influence than competitive bidding.
This is undoubtedly true in so far as discretionary allocation allows a
government to choose the operator for each available area. However,
such a choice may well prove difficult to make when there are several
qualified applicants for a particular area. 2 0 0 Moreover, there is no
reason why competitive bidding should preclude the exercise of a
degree of government control sufficient for most circumstances. A
government may prescribe in advance of each sale the special condi198. See text accompanying notes 122 & 172, supra. An important feature of the
Canadian right of conversion results in greater inflexibility in the Canadian system than in
the Australian. In Canada the right of conversion is automatic within the permit term; a
commercial discovery of oil or gas is not required. In Australia the right of conversion arises
only upon commercial discovery.
199. In Canada, for example, the existing royalty rates may be entrenched for as long as
53 years from the date of issue of exploratory permits if this view is correct.
200. Note the United Kingdom experience in this regard, notes 80 & 81, supra, and
accompanying text.
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tions upon which offshore oil and gas rights will be granted,2 01
including provisions dealing with eligibility of applicants and work
programmes. Formulation of such conditions may be difficult and
time-consuming, but will not prove impossible so long as the government is in possession of adequate exploration data relating to the
areas to be offered.
The practice of free entry as adopted in Canada is quite inconsistent with government control and flexibility. The government
abrogates its responsibility to select which areas are to be devoted to
oil and gas operation and leaves the question of timing of oil and gas
exploration and production entirely to the industry. This is an sharp
contrast with the trend in the United States towards increasing
government control in the matters of location and timing of oil and
gas operations. 02 Moreover, free entry in Canada has restricted the
future options available to the government by allowing practically
the entire prospective offshore area to be covered by permits
obtained in this way. The nature and extent of private rights
acquired under permits are therefore of great importance in defining
the scope of these future options.2 03
The situation in Australia is similar as a result of the decision to
allow the holders of exploration titles acquired prior to the enactment of the Submerged Lands Acts to exchange these for exploration licences, covering 75 per cent of the continental shelf. However,
there the loss of future options is mitigated somewhat by the more
2
onerous area reduction and conversion provisions. 04
The constitutional concept underlying the Australian system has
affected the exercise of government control in a manner which is not
applicable elsewhere. The agreement reached between the federal and
state governments avoided the necessity for immediate determination
of rights and responsibilities with respect to offshore oil and gas
resources, 2
but so far as other offshore resources are concerned
the issue remains clouded. This situation makes it difficult for one or
the other government to act as the arbiter of social values. In the
201. For example, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior may announce special conditions at
the lime of offering a lease for sale: 43 C.F.R. § 3301.5 (1973).
202. See text accompanying notes 21-32, supra.
203. A. Thompson & M. Crommelin, Canada's Petroleum Leasing Policy-A Cornucopia
for Whom? (paper presented to Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa, March 22,
1973).
204. See text accompanying notes 167, 172-174, supra. The Canadian position will be
particularly bad if Oil and Gas Land Order No. 1-1961 is re-instated, as permitholders will
then be able to obtain leases over 100% of permit areas.
205. See text accompanying notes 148-150, supra.
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words of the Senate Select Committee on Off-Shore Petroleum
Resources,
In respect of matters such as protection and conservation of natural
features and resources of the off-shore waters and the off-shore seabed, the question of who has authority or responsibility to act is

unknown. In areas of public and political controversy-into which
questions of conservation and pollution have moved-the inability to
identify political responsibility is as unsatisfactory as the inability,
because of disputed and uncertain power, to initiate action or
authoritatively to disclaim responsibility. This must be the situation

while the constitutional question is unresolved. 2" 6
The terms of the agreement itself also promote rigidity. The
Submerged Lands Acts and any regulations made thereunder are not
to be amended except pursuant to a prior agreement between federal
and state governments.' '7 This requirement multiplies the difficulties in the path of future amendments and thus reduces the likelihood that the 2 legislation and regulations will remain responsive to
social changes. 0 8
C. Economic Rents
The allocation of offshore oil and gas rights by competitive sale is
one method by which a government may collect a substantial proportion of the economic rents from offshore oil and gas production. In
calculating bids private operators assess the present value to them of
the economic rents that may be generated from available areas.
Under certain conditions such calculations will not vary significantly
from the present social value of economic rents. First, it is essential
that there be adequate competition among bidders. This has been
confirmed in the United States in a study of the factors which determine the size of the high bid for leases. 2 0 The relationship between
the high bid and the following factors was analysed: the size of the
high-bidder firm; the total value of subsequent oil and gas production
from the lease area; the corporate structure of the high-bidder, whether
a single bidder or a joint venture; the number of acres in the lease area;
the number of bids received for the lease; and the estimated water
depth over the lease area (as an indicator of production costs). The
206. Report, supra note 147, para. 6.338.
207. See text following note 148, supra.
208. Difficulties in amending the legislation have already been encountered: Report,
supra, note 147, paras. 6.279-280. No regulations have yet been promulgated. The Designated Authority has wide powers to issue directions to offshore licence holders, and this
allows some flexibility in administration. The rigidity is, however, important as it affects the
basic legislation and future regulations.
209. 1 OCS study, supra note 6, at 517-521 (§ 8.20).
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study concluded that of all these variables the number of bids submitted for an area was the most important determinant of the bid
size-the greater the number of bidders, the higher the successful bid.
The importance of competition has been increasingly recognized
in the United States where procedures have been adopted to ensure
its maintenance at a satisfactory level.' 1 0 In the United Kingdom,
however, there is no record of steps having been taken to promote
competition in the limited experiment of competitive bidding in
1971.211

In the United States important progress has been made in this
regard by the Department of the Interior through development of
techniques for calculating minimum acceptable bids for lease
areas. 2 1 2 Nevertheless, two qualifications should be noted. First,
there is no evidence that the Department has included a consideration of opportunity cost in its assessment procedure. The social value
of an area in its highest use (other than oil and gas production)
should always be exceeded by the highest bid before a lease is
granted. Opportunity costs may be considered in the preparation of
impact statements under the National Environmental Policy Act, 2 1 3
but even so it is appropriate that minimum acceptable bids as calculated by the Department never be less than these costs. Second, it is
clear that the Department has been hampered in its efforts by
nondisclosure of geophysical information obtained by potential
bidders under exploration permits.2 14 It is obvious that full disclosure of data should be made a condition of the grant of a permit
as is the case in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. There
appears no need for the companies to disclose interpretations as well,
provided that these can be done adequately by the Geological
Survey. Where necessary, the Geological Survey should also conduct
its own exploratory operations to ensure adequate knowledge of
each area before applications for leases are invited.
Experience in the United States has also shown the importance of
the timing of area sales in the maintenance of effective competition. 1s Undoubtedly, the question of timing is one of the most
difficult encountered in the management of offshore oil and gas
resources. In essence, a government must make an assessment of the
210. See text accompanying notes 11-27, supra.
211. See text accompanying notes 75 & 76, supra. All high bids submitted for blocks
were accepted. The Department of Trade and Industry does not appear to have calculated
minimum acceptable bids.
212. See text accompanying notes 12-17, supra.
213. 42 U.S.C. § § 4321-4347 (1971). See text accompanying note 32, supra.
214. See text accompanying notes 36 & 37, supra.
215. See text accompanying notes 21-25, supra.
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relative social values placed upon these resources both now and at
different points in the future, and it must recognize that one of the
costs of production today is the present value of future production
which is thereby lost. The Nixon Administration's plan to accelerate
offshore leasing 2 1 6 is clearly a decision in favour of the present
rather than the future.
Uncertainty will cause a reduction in bids offered for offshore oil
and gas areas. To some extent uncertainty is inevitable because the
presence of oil or gas and the quantity of any deposit cannot be
determined accurately until an extensive drilling programme has been
completed. Moreover, lower bids do not necessarily represent
reduced economic rents, for the government is paying the cost of
obtaining information about an unexplored area. Nevertheless, uncertainty may be reduced in several ways. It may be profitable for a
government to conduct some exploration operations itself-this will
depend on the discount rate used by private operators to take
account of uncertainty. In a new region the government should withhold substantial areas from allocation until information is obtained
from the initial exploratory effort. Failure to exercise such restraint
would appear to have been costly in the United Kingdom and may
still prove to be so in Canada and Australia. Finally, adoption of a
flexible management system is likely to induce less uncertainty than
2
a socially unacceptable rigid system. 17
There are several different methods of competitive sale of offshore
oil and gas rights. These include cash bonus bidding, deferred bonus
bidding, royalty bidding, and work commitment bidding.
The cash bonus system as used for the United States outer continental shelf lands and the 1971 United Kingdom experiment has
the advantage of offering a strong incentive to the successful bidder
to explore and develop the area in order to get an early return on
capital invested. It is also a simple method to administer. There are,
however, disadvantages. It is frequently argued in the United States
that cash bonus bidding reduces the effectiveness of competition
because the sums of money necessary to purchase a lease are beyond
the reach of smaller operators. It is also said that payment of cash
bonuses places a heavy strain on the financial resources of the major
oil companies and thus inhibits the exploration of acquired areas.
This problem is claimed to be growing in importance as the major
companies find it increasingly difficult to finance lease costs from
retained earnings. Both arguments amount to an assertion that the
216. See text accompanying notes 28-30, supra.
217. See text accompanying note 196, supra.
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capital market functions inefficiently in regard to oil and gas operations. This is difficult to accept in relation to the major companies.
Moreover, if it were true in relation to the smaller companies, one
would expect that the majors would consistently be able to submit
higher bids for leases. The history of leasing on the outer cotinental
shelf lands provides no evidence that this has been the case.' 18 In
addition, the capital market has shown no signs of having exhausted
its ingenuity in making funds available for exploration operations.' 1 9

In recent years there has been a trend in the United States towards
grouping of companies into joint ventures to bid for offshore leases.
There is a clear danger here that competition will be reduced where
the joint venturers consist of major oil companies, and a government
should closely examine the identity of participants in such groups to
ensure that this is not the case. 2 20 On the other hand, there are
potential advantages to be gained from allowing joint venturing. Even
among the major companies this process may be used to spread the
risk inherent in offshore operations. Moreover, it provides a means
whereby smaller companies may overcome any imperfections in the
capital market.
A more serious disadvantage of the cash bonus system of competitive sale arises from the discount rate employed by private enterprise
in calculating the present value of offshore oil and gas rights. If
private operators use a higher discount rate than the social rate
selected by the government, the size of cash bonus bids will be less
than the present social value of the economic rents that the resources
are capable of producing. While it cannot be stated in general that
private and social discount rates will diverge in this way,2 2 ' it
appears that this may often be the case at least in developed countries.2 22 There is no complete solution to this problem. Nevertheless, the effects of it may be substantially reduced in two ways. First,
the financial terms of offshore rights should be subject to review at
218. 1 OCSstudy, supranote6, at517-521 (§ 8.20).
219. For example, the system of advance-payments for future gas discoveries has provided over $1.6 billion for exploration in North America in the last two years: Oil and Gas
J., August 14, 1972, at 41.
220. The Department of the Interior has recently proposed a rule which would prohibit
companies with more than 5 billion barrels of proved reserves from bidding with each other
in offshore lease sales. This would prevent joint ventures among the "big eight": Oil and Gas
J., April 29, 1974, at 34.
221. In some circumstances, the divergence may be in the opposite direction. For example, in the present situation of domestic energy shortages the United States may very
strongly prefer present to future oil production, particularly if these shortages are expected
to be temporary.
222. The income tax system is one of several possible causes.
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regular intervals so that benefits and costs do not have to be discounted too far into the future. Second, a government may collect a
portion of the economic rents in the form of royalties on production. The more significant the divergence in discount rates, the
greater emphasis the government should place upon royalties (in
conjunction with cash bonus bidding). A substantial reliance upon
royalties as a means of capturing the economic rents also mitigates
any problems arising from defects in the capital market. The failure
in the United States to revise royalty rates upwards in response to
sharply increased prices for oil and gas has caused an escalation in the
size of bonus bids in recent sales and an increasing dissatisfaction
with the cash bonus allocation system.
Under the deferred bonus bidding system an operator pays the sale
price in installments and retains the option to surrender the rights
and discontinue the payments at any time. Advocates of this system
claim that it encourages participation by smaller companies and
reduces the necessity of discounting bids to take account of uncertainty. There is also a substantial incentive for rapid exploration,
should this be a government objective. Nevertheless, there would
appear to be formidable problems in the administration of such a
system as it encourages over-bidding and frequent surrender of rights
without detailed evaluation of oil and gas reserves.
Royalty bidding has also been supported on the ground that it
avoids the large capital drain caused by payment of cash bonuses.
Again, however, there are severe administrative difficulties, especially
in a situation where operators are producing from the same structure
at different production and royalty rates. The highest royalty operator is forced to abandon production on economic grounds before
operators with lower royalty rates. Furthermore, high royalty bids
result in premature abandonment of production areas causing significant economic waste. This is so particularly in the event of overbidding. The only alternative to this waste is government reduction
of royalty rates below the amount bid, a procedure which inevitably
results in considerable administrative difficulty and makes a mockery
of the initial bidding process.
The system of work commitment bidding is designed to encourage
rapid exploration. When compared with cash bonus bidding, though,
there seems little economic justification for it. An operator who
obtains oil and gas rights by payment of a cash bonus has taken into
account in submitting his bid the cost of exploring the area in the
most efficient way possible. If a government believes that this exploration will be slower than the socially-desired rate, it may specify
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operations to be conducted within time limits as a condition of
bidding and still use the cash bonus system. Work commitment
bidding is likely to result in government loss of a portion of the
economic rents either by promoting inefficiency in exploration or by
allowing excess private profits.
Two types of bidding procedure are available for use in the
competitive sale of offshore oil and gas rights. These are oral auction
and sealed bids. One writer has determined that "[wI here the structure of the buying industry is monopsonistic or oligopolistic and
competition is unreliable, sealed bidding is the more appropriate
method since it introduces a measure of uncertainty about who may
appear as a bidder and how he may bid in his one-shot sealed
bid." 2 2 This is clearly demonstrated in offshore oil and gas bidding
in the United States and the United Kingdom by the wide differences
which often exist between highest and next-highest bids, known by
industry as "money left on the table." 2 24
However, there are problems associated with the sealed bidding
method. Operators hate to leave money on the table, and it is clear
that value estimates for oil and gas rights are commonly adjusted to
take account of the expected degree of competition.2 2 This
emphasizes again the importance of government assessment of
minimum acceptable bids. It also suggest that a government should
not announce the size of any bids other than the highest for each
area; this practice has been scrupulously followed in Alberta and may
make it more difficult for operators to evaluate the bidding strategy
of competitors. Another problem is that operators must calculate the
amount of each bid for all areas offered at a sale without knowing
which if any will be successful. This may affect the size of bids,
particularly if capital market imperfections are significant. One way
to lessen the impact of this problem is to have frequent small sales
instead of infrequent large ones. Other more complex remedies are
also available. These include contingency bidding, where an operator
may bid different amounts for a single area according to whether or
not bids submitted for other areas are successful, and "sliding" bids,
where the operator may rank the order in which his bids are to be
223. Mead, NaturalResource Disposal Policy-OralAuction Versus Sealed Bids, Natural
Resources J. 194, 223 (1967).
224. Examples of United States experience are quoted in 1 OCS Study, supra note 6, at
489-503 (§ 8.16). In the United Kingdom sale in 1971, the bid of 21 million pounds by
Shell-Esso for block 211/21 was more than 12.6 million pounds higher than the second bid for
that block submitted by Mobil.
225. A bidding strategy which takes account of the probability that any bid will be
successful in calculating the size of that bid is developed in K. Brown, Bidding for Offshore
Oil. Toward an Optimal Strategy (1969).
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accepted with a limit upon total capital committed. This latter procedure has been used successfully in Alberta.
If offshore oil and gas rights are allocated by administrative discretion or free entry, the government must rely for the collection of
economic rents upon methods other than competitive private
determination. A number of these are available. All suffer from the
disadvantage that the allocation process does not cause each area to
go to the operator capable of developing it as least cost, so that total
economic rents are likely to be lower than in the case of competitive
allocation.
Perhaps the most common method consists of a royalty charged
upon production. Royalty payments are not an effective means of
capturing the full economic rents. In any oil and gas field there are
many factors which are significant in determining the size of
economic rents. Among these, four important considerations are the
quantity of oil and gas that may be produced, the rate of production,
the costs of discovery and production, and the price for which the oil
and gas may be sold. A royalty payment calculated on gross value of
production takes some account of quantity and price but ignores the
other factors. A sliding-scale royalty which increases with rate of
production incorporates one more, and even better is a sliding-scale
royalty which increases further with rising wellhead prices. However,
costs are still overlooked. A sliding-scale royalty calculated upon the
net value of production does incorporate cost factors, but the percentage chosen is arbitrary and there is no reason to assume that it
represents the full economic rents. The difficulties encountered in
calculating a royalty rate just sufficient to capture all economic rents
are formidable, and as the relevant factors vary considerably from
one producing area to another, a separate calculation is required for
each.
Furthermore, royalty payments may result in economic inefficiency unless rates are adjusted during the life of a field. A fixed
royalty assessed upon the gross value of production will cause the
shut-down of a producing field when the value of production is no
longer sufficient to pay the royalty and cover operating costs. Thus
oil or gas may be left in the ground although it is capable of being
produced commercially at lower royalty rates. Governments in all
countries have guarded against this by providing for a reduction in
royalty rates in such circumstances. A royalty assessed upon the net
value of production may operate as a disincentive for operators to
minimize costs, and complexity in administration is increased.
This is not to say that royalty payments hould not play an im-
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portant part in obtaining government revenue from offshore oil and
gas resources. What it does suggest is that royalty payments alone are
unlikely to capture the full economic rents. However, the advantages
of combining royalty payments, particularly on a sliding-scale basis,
with competitive bidding have been noted.' 2 6
Rental payments assessed at a fixed rate per unit area of land
subject to oil and gas rights are in no way related to economic rents.
The economic impact of a rental is upon rate of exploration and
production. It seems unlikely, though, that rental payments of the
size required in the four countries' 2 ' have had any significant effect
upon the timing of offshore oil and gas operations.
Another method that has been used for obtaining a share of the
economic rents involves compulsory surrender of part of the original
exploration area after a specified time. The limitations inherent in
this method are obvious; for example, in all cases the operator selects
the area to be retained. In the United Kingdom it has been found
that there is little interest in much of the relinquished area.2 2 8 In
Canada, Land Order No. 1-1961229 had the effect of abandoning
this method while the order remained in force, since permitholders
were afforded the option of recovering surrendered areas in exchange
for higher royalty payments. This will again be the situation if the
order is reinstated as requested by industry. In Australia also this
method has been implicitly abandoned by allowing the acquisition of
production licences covering an entire location, which in most cases
will be more than large enough to encompass a producing field.2 30
The income tax system provides another means by which a government may share in the economic rents from offshore oil and gas
production. As with royalty payments, though, only a fraction of the
total rents is obtained, depending upon the effective rate of income
tax. In the United States and Canada this fraction is small because of
special tax concessions given to the oil industry.2 3 1 Moreover, the
tax system does not provide an effective substitute for other
methods of capturing economic rents. It is usually both complex and
226. See text following note 222, supra.
227. See text accompanying notes 41, 84, 138, & 183, supra.
228. In 1964, licences were issued in respect of 80,000 square kilometres. In 1970,
62,000 square kilometres of this area were surrendered. Of this, 27,000 square kilometres
have since been reoffered for licensing, and just under 40% has been taken up: Report, supra
note 147, at 73.
229. See note 130, supra, & accompanying text.
230. See text accompanying notes 173-178, supra. A location covers approximately 225
square miles, whereas fields discovered to date cover merely 30 square miles (Kingfish) and
17 square miles (Halibut).
231. Notably, immediate deduction of all exploration and some development costs, and
depletion allowances.
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inflexible and thus incapable of prompt amendment to take account
of changing circumstances.
At this point, reference should be made to the various incentives
offered in different countries for oil and gas exploration. It has been
claimed that an important factor in the choice of administrative
discretion for allocation of rights in the United Kingdom was the
incentive thereby given for rapid exploration. This reason has also
been given for the use of free entry in Canada. In the case of the
United Kingdom, the value of bids received in the 1971 auction
experiment 2 2 suggests strongly that the cost of this incentive has
been high. Similar evidence is not availabe in Canada but the result is
unlikely to be diferent. In any event the fact remains that the cost of
this type of incentive is hidden, and the efficiency of the subsidy is
virtually impossible to assess. This is also the case with taxation
incentives such as immediate capital deductions and depletion allowances. On the other hand, the cost is obvious where there is a direct
subsidy given to exploration operations as in Australia under the
Petroleum Search Subsidy Scheme. 2 33
In cases where the allocation process has failed to capture the
economic rents from offshore oil and gas production, governments
have increasingly turned to other methods of achieving the same end.
These have usually involved direct government participation in
production or distribution, or the regulation of prices that may be
charged for products at the production or distribution stage.
Examples of price regulation are provided by the Federal Power
Commission's control of natural gas pricing in the United States2 34
and government determination of indigenous crude oil prices in
Australia. 2 13
These attempts have been fraught with problems of
efficiency and equity. Prices must be high enough to encourage
exploration at the socially-desired rate, but if so they are unlikely to
capture all the economic rents, particularly for low-cost fields. On
the other hand, such rents as are obtained are distributed among the
users of the end products rather than the public as a whole.
Numerous refinements have been incorporated into price-regulation schemes in order to overcome these difficulties. One of these
invoves the establishment of a government corporation with exclusive rights to purchase oil or gas. This is the position of the British
232. See Table I, supra.
233. See text accompanying note 171, supra.
234. For a history and critical discussion of this activity, see the papers collected in
Regulation of the Natural Gas Producing Industry (K. Brown ed. 1972).
235. Report, supra note 147, paras. 9.88-126. Prices were originally set above world
market prices in order to provide an incentive for local production, but recently they have
been held substantially below world levels.
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Gas Corporation in relation to natural gas. In addition, the Australian
government has recently announced that it will purchase all oil and
gas produced from the north-west shelf region. In this way the equity
problem may be overcome to some extent, for the government
corporation may sell its products at a market-determined price and
assign its profits to general government revenue.' 3 6 Nevertheless, the
problem still remains of determining purchase prices which will
provide a sufficient incentive for exploration without transferring a
significant portion of the economic rents to private operators.
A government may also collect part of the economic rents through
direct participation in production of offshore oil and gas. In many
ways the result is similar to the use of net royalty payments or
income taxes for the government obtains a share of the total
economic rents based upon the extent of its interest in production
operations. In fact, the current popularity of direct government
participation finds its explanation in benefits other than the share of
the economic rents, such as domestic control of operations, acquisition of knowledge, development of technical and managerial skills,
access to world product markets and promotion of domestic investment. 2 3'7
In the United Kingdom there has been a degree of public participation through the nationalized industries and the government's 48
percent shareholding in British Petroleum. A comparable situation
exists in Canada by virtue of the federal government's 45 percent
shareholding in Panarctic Oils. However, this participation is different in form from that which has been common in Norway and the
Middle East. The governments in these countries have not usually
taken part in operations until commercial production has been established, so that private operators have continued to bear the exploration risks in full. In the United Kingdom and Canada the "public"
corporations have participated in operations from the initial acquisition of exploration rights and have contributed to all exploration
expenditures as they are incurred.
CONCLUSION
From this analysis the conclusion emerges that the role of government in the management of offshore oil and gas resources is bound
236. In practice, this policy has not been followed by the British Gas Corporation, and it
is not known yet whether it will be in Australia. However, it has been recommended that a
Crown corporation be established in British Columbia for purchase of natural gas at the
wellhead: Report on Matters Concerning the Natural Gas Industry in British Columbia
(September 14, 1973).
237. H. Zakariya, State Participation in the Petroleum Industry (paper presented to the
Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Ottawa, 22 March 1973).
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to increase in the future. Public ownership of these resources, their
location within a complex marine environment, and their growing
importance in economic development make this inevitable. What is
not determined, though, is the form that government intervention
will take.
Establishment of a flexible and efficient management regime
controlling the activities of private enterprise is one alternative.
There seems to be no reason why this approach should not succeed.
A system of competitive allocation of private rights under close
government supervision, with the opportunity to review financial
conditions at reasonable intervals, is capable of deriving a substantial
public benefit from offshore oil and gas resources.
The other alternative is direct government participation. The
benefits to be derived from this approach have already been noted,
but it is not clear that they will necessarily exceed the costs. There
are still problems of efficiency and equity to be solved in each case
of government participation in production or distribution.
Perhaps the most powerful argument in favour of direct government participation lies in the failure of some indirect management
systems to protect the public interest in offshore oil and gas resources. This is the present situation in the United Kingdom, Canada
and Australia. Direct participation is sought on the ground that it
provides a remedy for the ills caused by inflexible and inefficient
management regimes. It need not be the only remedy, though, so
long as a substantial revision of existing management systems remains
possible.

